Columbia University in the City of New York

Sep 13, 20184:15 pm
Seminar

Using Visual Salience in Game Theory

Featuring Dr. Colin F. Camerer, Robert Kirby Professor of Behavioral Finance and Economics, California Institute of Technology

September 13th, 4:15 pm – 5:30 pm at the Jerome L. Greene Science Center (9th floor lecture hall)

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We measure and study visual salience in two-player games, in which players both prefer to match choices of locations or one prefers match and the other mismatch (hide-and-seek). Visual salience is predicted a priori from a computational algorithm based on principles from theoretical neuroscience and previously calibrated by human free gaze data. Salience is a strong predictor of choices, which results in a matching rate of 64% in two samples. Both seekers and hiders choose salient locations more often, though seekers also choose low-salience locations. The result is a “seeker’s advantage” in which seekers win about 9% of the games, compared to a mixed-Nash benchmark of 7%. A salience-perturbed cognitive hierarchy (SCH) model is estimated from the hide-and-seek data. Those estimated parameters accurately predict the choice-salience relation in the matching games. 

This seminar will be held in the Jerome L. Greene Science Center (9th floor lecture hall). A reception will follow; open to all seminar attendees.

All attendees must register here in order to gain access to the Jerome L. Greene Science Center.

This seminar is part of the Cognition and Decision Seminar Series, which is jointly sponsored by the Cognitive and Behavioral Economics Initiative of the Department of Economics and the Center for Decision Sciences.

Venue: the Jerome L. Greene Science Center (9th floor lecture hall)
3227 Broadway, New York, NY 10027

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